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Ronald Collins: It's a delight to be back here in the Pacific
Northwest where I once had the honor to teach. Thank you, Kellye Testy
and Dana Gold, for including me in this splendid conference. And, of
course, a bow to my colleague of many years, Professor David Skover.
Today's discussion will be about a rather famous case-actually, a
non-case, Nike v. Kasky. 1 Is there anybody in the room who didn't file
an amicus brief in Nike? There were so many people who filed on this or
that side in the case. All three of our panelists today filed amicus briefs. I
think Martin Redish filed one as well. And Erik Jaffe, I think you also
filed an amicus brief in Nike.
Question: When you think about a case like Nike, where is the
conservative/liberal divide? Laurence Tribe, he's liberal. So why is he
representing Nike in the United States Supreme Court? And Erwin
Chemerinsky, the great defender of the First Amendment, why did he
oppose Nike's First Amendment rights? Where does the conserva-
tive/liberal divide fall here? I point this out not by any means to be right-
eous, but to show you how difficult it is, conceptually, if you think about
it, to say, well, who's conservative and who's liberal and who's good and
who's bad? So again, where does the divide fall?
Let me say a few words about the Nike case 2 so we see it in context,
and then we'll turn to our panelists. Starting in 1996, CBS, a corporate
entity, the New York Times, a corporate entity, and the Los Angeles
Times, another corporate entity, wrote or published or aired a series of
stories about the plight of workers in Nike's overseas factories.3 The
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stories described the working conditions in Vietnam as horrendous.
Workers, mostly women between the ages of fifteen and twenty-eight,
spent six days a week in factories for $40 a month, quite often in condi-
tions that would be considered deplorable or inhumane by our standards,
so the stories went. Sometimes the women fainted from exhaustion, heat,
or poor nutrition.
One New York Times columnist said that Nike executives were not
troubled by those conditions, even after CBS aired the stories that
sparked an investigation by human rights advocates. So, the story went,
even after these stories came out, Nike-in its arrogance-maintained
these deplorable working conditions in Vietnam.
Nike denied the allegations of abuse in its factories. The company
said, however, that if there were such problems, it would launch an in-
vestigation. In one New York Times news story, Nike's spokesperson
said, "Nike workers earn superior wages and manufacture products under
superior conditions. ' 4 All's well in Vietnam, so they said.
Marc Kasky, a California activist, was enraged by Nike's state-
ments, and he decided to sue the company under California's unfair
business practices law in the hopes that he could force Nike to admit to
the mistreatment of workers. When he filed his case he alleged no injury
to himself personally or to anyone else; he filed the action as a private
attorney general in the California courts. And when the matter went all
the way to the California Supreme Court, the Court decided by a four-to-
three vote in Marc Kasky's favor that indeed he could commence this
action against Nike. He could force Nike, if you will, to tell the truth.
A petition was filed in the United States Supreme Court. At that
time Nike's general counsel had approached many people, including
myself, and asked for assistance as they filed briefs in the Court. And an
enormous number of briefs were filed.
There were oral arguments in the Court. Nobody, however, had
really bothered to ask the question that any first year law student would
have asked: was the California statute that gave rise to the case violated?
But since this was a huge constitutional case, even seasoned lawyers
overlooked the obvious. Thanks in good measure to Professor Vladeck,
and I'm sure also to briefs filed by Professor Piety on behalf of the Sierra
Club, the Court ultimately withdrew jurisdiction in the case and thus
never reached any of the constitutional questions.6
4. Steven Greenhouse, Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam is Called Unsafe for Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1997, atAl.
5. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243.
6. Nike, 539 U.S. at 658-63.
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The case went back, and our hero Marc Kasky is this close, ladies
and gentlemen, to bringing the great Nike to its knees, to having discov-
ery, and to pointing out to the public what all the newspapers in fact had
already written-that Nike was indeed exploiting its workers, or at least
so the claim went.
But in the eleventh hour the Lord works in strange ways. A deal
was struck, whereby Nike would admit to no fault, but would pay $1.5
million to the Fair Labor Association, a workers' rights group, and at
least $500,000 a year in funding to a micro-loan program that subsidized
entrepreneurial ventures for foreign employees.
7
Did Marc Kasky and his lawyers receive any money? Who knows?
It's a secret agreement, but it is strange that this man, who was so dedi-
cated, in the eleventh hour decided, for whatever reason, not to proceed.
The moral? We take our "heroes" as we find them.
Well, where that case ends is where our story-and our discus-
sion-begins today. We have a wonderful group of people to discuss and
examine this case. Let's start with my friend Professor David Vladeck,
who teaches at Georgetown Law School. He's been with Public Citizen
for twenty-five years, and in my estimation is one of the finest public
interest advocates I've had the pleasure of meeting. Professor Vladeck,
welcome.
To his immediate right is Professor Tamara Piety, who is on the
faculty of the University of Tulsa Law School, and who filed an amicus
brief on behalf of the Sierra Club. Anybody who is writing or reading in
the area of commercial speech, if you don't know the name Tamara
Piety, you soon will. She's written extensively on it and has a
forthcoming book on it. Professor Piety, welcome.
And on the far end, last, of course but not least, is Mark Lopez,
senior counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who
filed a significant amicus brief in the Nike case, and who has been very
active in a number of matters on behalf of the ACLU involving campaign
finance laws and very important areas involving the privatization of the
public forum. Mr. Lopez, welcome.
Professor Piety, let's start with you.
Tamara Piety: You might well ask, why was the Sierra Club inter-
ested in this case? The Sierra Club got involved because it was con-
cerned about "green washing" and the way in which false "green '8
claims may lower the incentives for real investment in potentially more
costly, but more environmentally sound, manufacturing processes. If a
7. Collins & Skover, supra note 2, at 1020.
8. "Green" here refers to claims that something about the product-its manufacture or sale-is
undertaken with concern for the environmental impact.
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manufacturer can make false green claims with impunity, this may mean
that false claims are indistinguishable from true claims and that those
firms not investing in more environmentally sound practices can free-
ride off those that do. Indeed, if there is no penalty for making false
claims, there would actually be an incentive to make false claims because
if you don't have to actually put into practice the presumably more ex-
pensive green production methods, 9 then you can get the benefit of that
reputation without actually having to pay the price for it. This is some-
thing that the Sierra Club is very concerned about, and given the way
Nike pleaded in its motion to dismiss, immunity for false claims was a
real possibility.
Before I speak to the procedural posture of the Nike case, however,
I want to start by mentioning a fairly provocative idea. And that is the
proposition that for-profit corporations-and I'll put aside the press for a
moment-don't have "opinions" as we normally understand that word
and that they are inappropriate rights holders under the First Amend-
ment. This proposition runs counter to much of the established doctrine
in this area, but I argue that we need to revisit the assumptions in this
area. Everything a for-profit entity "says," whether in the form of adver-
tising or in the form of a purported contribution to a matter of public
concern, is marketing.10 There are a number of names for this marketing:
"issue advertising," "image advertising," public relations, etc.-but all of
this speech is marketing. I will say more about this later.
Another provocative nugget of food for thought: we're often told
that advertising doesn't work, that it can't convince people to buy some-
thing they don't want. And I suspect no group thinks they are more im-
mune to its effects than academics. But consider this: Could it really be
the case that the billions spent per year on market research are similarly
wasted? There is a good deal of evidence that it is not; even if it does not
result in marketers being able to perfectly program consumers to respond
like automatons to selling messages, market research has helped refine
those approaches in ways that improve marketers' ability to stimulate
consumption. This is why marketers spend a lot of time trying to figure
out what parts of their marketing works.
9. It may be a mistake to assume that environmentally sound practices are necessarily always
more expensive. They may in some cases be less expensive. But discussions about implementation
of such practices tend to take place in the context of a background assumption that fundamental
changes in process will be costly to the extent that they require changes to existing infrastructure or
additional infrastructure investments.
10. Obviously, sometimes a corporation's "speech" is operational. That is, it speaks to carry
out its business, and it clearly can speak in the form of response to subpoenas and the like. This
statement refers to that sort of speech which, in its form and content, seems an analogue to expres-
sive speech by a human being.
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Nielsen, the ratings company, and others organizations try to meas-
ure how many people are watching specific shows so they know how
many people are seeing the ads. That information in turn allows them to
tell advertisers when they pay for these ads what they are actually
getting. But that is not all. For many years advertisers have been doing
market research to try to figure out what type of advertising works. And
some of that research has suggested to them that explicit claims don't
work as well as emotional appeals. This has resulted in a shift away from
what advertisers call "reason-why advertising"-"buy our toothpaste for
pearlier whites"-and into press releases and public relations and other
kinds of non-traditional advertising forms.
What is the significance of this move for the Nike case? As adver-
tising has shifted away from explicit claims, marketers haven't ceased
making them. They've just moved them into the form of press releases,
advertorials, issue advertising, and the like-speech forms that character-
ize public relations speech and not traditional advertising but which, like
traditional advertising, are made in the hopes of financial gain for the
company. The statements made in the Nike case were principally made in
these forms.
So, in the Kasky complaint, what we have are counts for violations
of these false advertising and unfair trade practices laws.l1 Kasky alleged
that Nike's statements about its labor practices were false and thus vio-
lated the law. Count Two of his complaint alleged that these statements
constituted fraud and deceit on the grounds that Nike's misrepresenta-
tions were made "with knowledge [that they were false] and with reck-
less disregard of the law of California prohibiting false and misleading
statements."' 2 Later, a question was raised whether this phrase reflected
an intention to plead intentional and knowing misstatement. However,
there are a number of other allegations in the complaint, and I maintain,
looking at the complaint as a whole (as a reviewing court is bound to do),
the complaint makes clear that Kasky intended to allege that there was an
intentional misrepresentation by Nike.
Let me give you one of my favorite examples. Nike issued a press
release on October 27 in which it addressed concerns from some
members of the public regarding women's issues: "Nike is fulfilling our
responsibility as a global corporate citizen each and every day by guaran-
teeing a living wage for all workers . . . and creating opportunities for
11. Complaint, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (No. 994446), available at
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=3448 (last visited May 16, 2007).
12. Id. 67.
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women's financial independence.' 3 This press release is quoted in
Kasky's complaint.
However, just about a month before that press release was issued,
Dusty Kidd, a Nike employee, wrote the following in a letter to the CEO
of the YWCA:
I am fully cognizant of the call on the part of some for a "living
wage." That is generally defined as sufficient income to support the
needs of a family of four. We simply cannot ask our contractors to
raise wages to that level-whatever that may be-while driving us
all out of business, and destroying jobs, in the process.14
Whatever the dispute may be about what constitutes a living wage, it
seems fairly clear, to the extent a corporation ever has a "state of mind"
or can have an "idea," Nike knew at the time that Ms. Reich made the
first quoted statement that it wasn't paying a living wage, "whatever that
might be," because, as reflected in the second sentence of Dusty Kidd's
letter, Nike viewed a living wage as "driving us all out of business." The
juxtaposition of these two quotes in the complaint seems to makes clear
that Kasky intended to allege that Nike intentionally lied.
Nike's response to Kasky's claims for fraud and deceit, and indeed
to all of the allegations, was a demurrer-that is, "You [Kasky] failed to
state a cause of action; fraud and deceit are barred by the First Amend-
ment." 15 Now that seems to me to be a really radical claim-one seeking
more protection under the First Amendment than anyone enjoys.
As we've heard already, and will undoubtedly hear more about in
greater detail today, the commercial speech doctrine that was articulated
in Virginia Pharmacy Board16 suggested that the reason the Court de-
cided to extend limited protection to truthful commercial speech was be-
cause of the need for truthful information in the marketplace to assist
consumers in making purchasing decisions. The decision indicated that
the sort of governmental paternalism that would authorize the suppres-
sion of truthful information would need to meet a more exacting review
than had previously sufficed. The Court focused on the listener's right to
hear and on the public interest in receiving truthful information, and al-
most not at all on some notion of the right of the speaker to speak.17 The
13. Id. 59 (citing Press Release, Nike, Inc., Nike Addresses Concerns Regarding Women's
Issues and Highlights Leadership in Worker Initiatives (Oct. 27, 1997)).
14. Id. 60 (citing Letter from Dusty Kidd, Director of Labor Practices, Nike, Inc., to Prema
Mattai-Davis, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer, YWCA of America (Sept. 28, 1997)).
15. See Nike, Inc., v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003).
16. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
17. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
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public interest revolved around receipt of truthful information, and truth
became a threshold test for protection.
The commercial speech doctrine that was developed and further
articulated in Central Husdon18 provides that in order to receive constitu-
tional protection, commercial speech must involve a legal activity and
not be misleading. A doctrine intended to ensure that consumers get
truthful information doesn't seem like a good basis for claiming a
constitutional right to lie. And if it does not, this is because, I argue, the
Court was not writing in terms of the speakers' interest and because it
seemed to think that most of this speech would take a form in which, to
the extent there was a claim, the claim would be made in advertising and
could be tested. Today, fewer claims are made in advertising, an area that
the doctrine clearly regulates, and many claims are made in the form of
public relations speech, a form the status of which is uncertain and that
Nike hoped to immunize by its demurrer. However, the claim for
immunization required a focus on the speakers' rights.
Much of the language in the Virginia Pharmacy case focuses on
whether or not listeners could get the information in question, not on
whether the speaker had a right to say it. Thus, the case doesn't offer
much support for the proposition that Nike had a right to make false
statements as a participant in a political debate versus the public's right
to know what Nike had to say. For example, here is a quote from
Virginia Pharmacy: "Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it
sometimes may seem, [is] nonetheless dissemination of information."' 9
This characterizes advertising as "information." But much advertising
isn't remotely like information in the ordinary sense of the word.
I would submit that although the Court uses the words "advertising"
and "commercial speech" interchangeably, this language revealed that
even at the time this opinion was written the Court was dealing with an
outmoded idea of "advertising." Advertising, even then, was no longer
limited to just exhortations like, "Buy our toothpaste, make your whites
pearlier white!" Rather, it had expanded into communications that didn't
actually make any explicit claims. So, when you have an advertising
campaign like "Newport, Alive with Pleasure!" you have to ask, "What
does that mean?" It doesn't say anything specifically, right? Does, "Alive
with Pleasure!" make a specific claim that you could say is false because
actually, if you smoke cigarettes you'll be "gray and dead" instead of
"Alive with Pleasure!"? No, the ad isn't intended to make a factual
claim. It's just intended to evoke some sort of emotional response from
18. Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
19. Id. at 765.
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you. And there is some evidence from market research that it is intended
to do so with knowledge of how the audience to which it was directed
will likely react emotionally.
In communications such as "Alive with Pleasure!" there is (appar-
ently) no factual claim, so there is not much to test for its truth. This was
not true, however, of Nike's claims about its labor practices. Claims that
Nike paid wages consistent with applicable minimum wage laws or that
certain workers received a free lunch were factual and could be tested.
Kasky alleged that these statements were knowingly false, and Nike re-
sponded that he failed to state a cause of action. The trial court and the
appellate courts agreed, but the California Supreme Court disagreed and
reversed. Because the case was still only in the pleading stage it was, as
the California court noted, still "early" and Kasky should have been
given an opportunity to develop the record in support of his allegations.
Nike, of course, filed a petition for certiorari.
But a curious thing happened. Between the time of the California
decision, when Nike had claimed that the First Amendment absolutely
barred Kasky's suit, and the petition for certiorari, Nike apparently belat-
edly realized that the Constitution doesn't offer blanket immunity for
fraud. So now for the first time appeared a claim that the Court should
apply the New York Times v. Sullivan20 standard to the kinds of
statements Nike made. I just want to say that I don't think the Sullivan
standard is appropriate because the Sullivan case was a defamation case,
so the defendants in that case were making statements about somebody
else. But in the context in which you are making positive statements
about yourself, presumably you're in the best position to know whether
or not what you say about yourself is true, and it makes little sense to
ask: "Did you say that with malice?" or "What did you mean when you
said that?" The question may come up, I suppose, when we get to the
more philosophically complex and perplexing category of
self-defamation, but I presume that will come up later in this conference.
The claim that Sullivan should apply was a belated recognition by Nike
that it had had overreached itself in asserting First Amendment immunity
for its commercial pronouncements. I do not think that Sullivan should
apply to commercial speech because I don't think commercial speech is
the sort of speech that the First Amendment ought to protect. However,
we don't need to import Sullivan to protect truthful commercial speech.
But this presents a dilemma of identifying what "commercial speech" is,
and that is difficult.
20. New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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So what is commercial speech? I'm not going to go through the
tests purporting to define it because there are a lot of them, and Ronald
Collins listed some. What I would add to Mr. Collins's list is the
California Supreme Court's test, which focuses on the speaker and the
intended audience, 21 and in which the content of the message as com-
mercial is key. This is a test that is deeply informed by the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.22 But
certainly, if the test for commercial speech is whether or not it constitutes
"traditional advertising," such a test would, I submit, potentially leave
the doctrine to regulate a largely empty set to the extent that, as I dis-
cussed before, much of what falls into the category of "traditional adver-
tising" today doesn't make any claims that can be tested. On the other
hand, if you recognize that much speech that passes for corporate self-
expression is just marketing by another name and that claims are made in
this area that have the potential to mislead the public, then it seems
appropriate to, at a minimum, provide a remedy for false claims made
through these channels, just as much as for those made through
traditional advertising.
Public relations and marketing people often acknowledge that pub-
lic relations speech is essentially marketing. But marketing doesn't cor-
respond very well to what we ordinarily identify as the sort of speech
that requires First Amendment protection. Nike would like to have its
marketing characterized as a "viewpoint" on globalization. However, for-
profit corporations don't have viewpoints. They have the goal of maxi-
mizing their returns and will often and demonstrably say whatever seems
to advance that goal, true or not. I do not have the time here to go into
why this feature makes for-profit corporations inappropriate rights hold-
ers under the First Amendment from a philosophical standpoint, or why
there might be a legitimate difference in the concerns raised by the
speech of for-profit institutional, fictional persons and that of not-for-
profit organizations or human beings. But, suffice it to say that the late
Milton Friedman's view was that a company has no business spending
money from its treasury for any kind of speech issue or social welfare
goal unless it is advancing the goal of profit maximization in some
way. 23 And I think that probably fairly restates the current law of
corporations, although with a wide latitude under the business judgment
rule for management to decide what sorts of speech and ancillary
expenditures might advance that goal.
21. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 258 (Cal. 2002).
22. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
23. See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER, 34 (2004) (interview with Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman).
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But there is no seriously disputing that a substantial portion of for-
profit speech delivered through public relations vehicles is marketing.
One thing about public relations speech is that you often get somebody
else to deliver your marketing message for you for free. This isn't true of
every marketing vehicle. Some, like traditional advertising, you have to
pay for. And even some public relations speech-that is, speech intended
to improve public image-is offered in an advertising format like image
advertising. An example of image advertising is taking out an ad saying,
"Nike supports a living wage," or "Nike supports the Environmental Pro-
tection Act." Why is Nike doing that? It's doing that because it wants to
get the benefit from the public perception of itself as a "personality," a
responsible, good citizen personality, in addition to its other advertising,
which may be intended to create a "hip" or "cool" personality. And I
think, by the way, that one of the psychological effects of this advertising
is to reinforce the legal notion of corporate personhood by grounding it
in these created personalities. So when a company makes statements
about itself as having a personality of a certain type, it tends to normalize
and reinforce the notion of corporate personhood.
Other favorite PR vehicles are press releases, video news releases,
and the like. They are issued in the hopes that their contents will be
picked up by the media as "news" and thus that any claims' therein will
gain credibility by coming from an apparently neutral third party-the
press. This technique has been fairly successful. Sometimes a press
release is picked up in its entirety without attribution to its source. This
practice actually implicates journalism ethics, another topic altogether
from that of the legal ramifications.
Public relations marketing can also take the form of the acceptance
by company representatives of public speaking engagements. I was on a
panel at the University of Miami School of Communications to which
Nike sent a representative. What is Nike's incentive to participate in
academic debate? Undoubtedly it is part of its marketing strategy.
Marketing can include promotional events, product placement in
movies and television, the list goes on and on. It includes what is known
as "stealth marketing," which, in case you haven't heard of it, is an in-
dustry term of art to refer to word-of-mouth marketing efforts where the
target audience interacts with someone one-on-one in the product en-
dorsement. That interaction often does not involve the endorser identify-
ing him or herself as paid by the product manufacturer. This occurs, for
example, when a marketer sends actors out to bars to pose as patrons and
to order and talk about a particular vodka in the hopes of generating
word of mouth on that vodka. Although the professional organizations
for word-of-mouth marketing insist that they support transparency and
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disclosure, since such disclosure isn't always made, one is left with the
suspicion that, like the press release carried by a newspaper as "news,"
this technique, to the extent that it works, depends on the target audience
believing that the person he or she is interacting with is not being paid
for the endorsement, but rather is simply sharing their enthusiasm for the
product with a stranger.
In addition, putting statements in forms that mimic opinion rather
than traditional advertising speech makes the speech appear more like
opinion and less like marketing. Nike claimed that putting its statements
in a form like a letter to the editor ought to take it out of the category of
regulated marketing speech and into the category of protected opinion
speech. However, at least one such letter quoted in the complaint seemed
to support the characterization under the commercial speech doctrine as a
proposal for a commercial transaction. It was a letter to the editor, 24 a
quintessential example of opinion, or so Nike claimed. But the letter
itself-offered and published during the holiday season-noted, "we en-
courage shoppers to remember" 25 that Nike was the industry leader in
improving labor practices overseas, and it went on to support Nike's
labor practices.
Why should we shield communications like this from liability if
they contain false factual claims? Making companies liable for a false
statement is not the same as censorship. It just means that if you're going
to make these statements in order to sell more sneakers, or coffee, or
whatever it is, and if the statements aren't true, then you ought to be held
liable for those misstatements, and there is nothing unfair about this.
Why should for-profit entities enjoy First Amendment protection for
intentional misstatements made with an eye to increasing profits under
the guise of protecting their "expressive rights"?
Well this was a very quick overview of some of the arguments I've
raised in other contexts addressing ideas about what the First Amend-
ment is meant to protect, which proceed from Thomas Emerson's articu-
lation for the four values the First Amendment is meant to protect 26 -
values which I submit do not support the extension of broad First
Amendment protection to for-profit corporations' speech generally, and
certainly not to false speech. These four values are: (1) the protection of
the human interest in self-expression, autonomy, and self-realization;
(2) protection for the discovery of truth; (3) protection of democracy as a
political process; and (4) the provision of a social "safety value" to allow
24. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 258. See supra note 11.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Thomas Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877
(1963).
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the expression of minority, dissident, and disruptive voices on the theory
that allowing expression is itself a way to defuse any threat posed by
such unrest.
As to the first concern, corporations are not human beings, so the
interest in protecting human expression, that whole justification falls out,
just drops away. Moreover, for a number of reasons, which Professor
Greenwood discusses, the for-profit corporation isn't a very good proxy
or conduit for human expression, whether of its employees or its share-
holders. Because managers are fiduciaries, their speech on behalf of the
corporation is not their own. And because of the very limited role that
shareholders play in corporate governance, as well as their often primary
interest in a financial return rather than having the corporation act as
their spokesperson, it doesn't speak for the shareholders either.
As to the truth component, there is fairly substantial evidence that
corporations will only disclose information that may be negative to prof-
itability when they are required to by law (and sometimes not even then)
and will similarly make statements intended to maximize the corpora-
tion's welfare to whatever the limits are of the laws governing false ad-
vertising, fraud, unfair competition, and the like. Indeed, they may have a
duty to do so. Given the fiduciaries' mandate to maximize the financial
well-being for the shareholders (as realized through the corporation, a
problem which itself deserves an entire symposium), the corporation has
a duty to say and do that which will maximize its value as long as it is
legal to do so. And it may seem to managers that it has a duty to do so
even when the behavior in question is illegal if the sanctions for doing so
are less than the risk associated with not doing so. I've had corporate
counsel say things to me to the effect that, "We need to be able to say to
clients that misstatements are illegal, because if we can't tell them it's
illegal, then there's no grounds for us to counsel them not to do it."
Given the possibility offered by the corporate form's perpetual life and
limited liability for investors and managers; the ability of large players in
some markets to dominate the market through the creation of widely rec-
ognized trademarks, logos, etc.; the ever-shrinking number of media de-
pendent on the advertising dollars of these large corporations; and fi-
nally, the absence of a readily identifiable entity with both the means and
the incentives to offer counter-speech, it doesn't seem that for-profit cor-
porate speech requires broad protection in order to protect the discovery
of the truth. To the contrary, these factors suggest that such protection
might actually diminish the amount of truthful information rather than
generate it. Remember, declining to offer the for-profit commercial
speaker a constitutional shield for fraud is not the same as saying that it
can't speak at all.
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As to democratic process, corporations-whether for-profit or not-
for-profit-aren't voters, and it would seem of less importance to protect
their speech in order to protect the democratic process than it would to
protect that of citizen voters. Indeed, some might say that through lobby-
ing, for-profit corporations actually have an enormous influence on the
political process, far more than the average citizen, and are in little need
of a constitutional shield for fraud.
Finally, because many of these entities are some of the largest and
most powerful institutions in the world, far more powerful than many
countries, it is somewhat ludicrous to suppose that we need to provide
them with a way to "blow off steam" in order to ensure social stability.
This brings me to my last point. In discussing the issue of commer-
cial speech, one of the things I think that we encounter is the promotion
of an abstract principle divorced from the actual practices in the world.
For example, the claim raised by many that the principle of equality for-
bids us from artificially restraining one "side" in the debate on globaliza-
tion ignores the reality that most of what is heard on this and other topics
in the culture is already one-sided. But it is the commercial side that we
hear, represented by companies like Nike because they are the ones with
the resources to speak, as well as the economic incentive to speak. So,
for example, Justice Chin of the California Supreme Court in his dissent
complained that the majority's holding lacked balance because it sub-
jected one side of the debate to different rules, unfairly hamstringing
Nike's statements.27 But where is the concern for "the balance" in
resources or incentives? Does it matter that Nike has more money than
almost any other speaker? Justice Chin's concern puts me in mind of the
famous quote from Anatole France about the law in its majesty equally
forbidding the rich and the poor from sleeping under bridges! Nike has
billions of dollars to promote its point of view, and there isn't really a
very good readily identifiable source of counter-speech with a similarly
concrete economic incentive to expose falsehoods. And the press, for
reasons related to incentive structures set up by concern about pleasing
advertisers, as well as ambiguities about the market for "the truth," is not
really a very good proxy for that concrete counter-speech.
Why should we care about whether we can regulate commercial
speech or whether we should view with some trepidation the prospect of
unrestrained commercial speech as was proposed by Nike and some of
its amici? For one: tobacco. The tobacco industry, as indicated in many
of the documents unearthed in the last several years of litigation, engaged
in deliberate obfuscation of the health risks of smoking, knowingly
27. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 263 (Chin, J., dissenting).
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marketed to children, and falsely denied the addictive properties of nico-
tine and the negative health consequences of secondhand smoke. Evi-
dence of these claims can be found in the opinion from the District Court
in D.C. in the conspiracy case brought against some tobacco compa-
nies.28 The opinion is approximately 1700 pages long and filled with
facts relevant to this discussion. Second, pharmaceuticals and public
health: there's been a lot of concern about the direct-to-consumer mar-
keting of pharmaceuticals and how that takes place, so we could add a
number of drugs to the list with nicotine. And it is not just the marketing
of harmful products. Other candidates for reasons to be concerned about
expansive protection for commercial speech might be global warming,
obesity, alcohol marketing, vehicle safety, securities regulation, and just
plain old ordinary consumer protection law, which might be put at risk
were the commercial speech doctrine done away with in favor of greater
protection for commercial speech.
Ronald Collins: Professor Piety, thank you very much for those
remarks. For those of you who are in doubt, the reference to the
Emersonian principle is Thomas Irwin Emerson, the late professor of
Yale Law School, and not to Ralph Waldo Emerson.
The next presenter is Mark Lopez of the American Civil Liberties
Union.
Mark Lopez: Thank you. Thank you, David Skover and Dana
Gold. This is a very timely and important discussion we're having today.
Thank you to Ronald Collins and my copanelists. They're all experts in
this business, and their points of view are very helpful to the discussion. I
want to particularly acknowledge Ronald Collins and his collaborator
Professor Skover, who produced a very readable and helpful law review
article on the topic in the '04 Case Western Law Review. 29 I read it on
the plane, and it really brought back Nike for me. I recommend it.
It's in my nature to respond to argument, so I'll start like that.
There are consequences to what corporations say. There are conse-
quences in the court of public opinion. If they say they're green, and
they're not green, you can bet the Sierra Club is going to be all over
them. You can bet that the Fourth Estate is going to run with it, and you
can bet that the competitors of that corporate speaker are going to make
hay of that misrepresentation as well.
Now, please appreciate that there are already laws that prohibit cor-
porations from engaging in fraud and deceit. They mostly target those
communications that propose a commercial transaction. And they're
28. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d I (D.C. 2006).
29. See Collins & Skover, supra note 2.
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there, and they should be there, and we have Professor Vladeck to thank
for them, to protect the consumer from misrepresentations that might
influence your product decision, your purchasing decisions. As the law
stands, it is largely confined to representations about price, availability,
and suitability.
Let me raise another issue in response to some comments I heard
earlier in the first panel. Let's not tar all corporations, or let's not paint
all corporations with the same tar. The ACLU is a corporation, so is the
Sierra Club, and I would submit to the young lady in the back who talked
about the inequities of wealth to the process of debate, I would suggest
that you join the Sierra Club and organizations like the ACLU and other
advocacy organizations, because your $5, your $15, can go a long way
when you aggregate those resources. They can go a long way in provid-
ing a counter-response to the aggregations of wealth that corporations
have.
So let me just tell you why the ACLU would be very concerned
about any attempt to regulate corporate speech. Like I said, we are a
corporation. One of the most important things we do is to criticize gov-
ernment. And when we do that, we often do it by criticizing elected
officials.
In 2002, I believe it was, the government decided to make it a crime
to engage in any broadcast advertising, whether it be radio or television,
that identified a federal candidate within thirty days of a primary elec-
tion, or within sixty days of general issue election.30 The law was written
broadly enough to catch an organization like the ACLU. Well, that's our
bread and butter. That's what we do. And, to our dismay, the Court
upheld that restriction, basically saying that, as corporations, we have the
ability to aggregate great amounts of resources and unfairly influence the
political process.
31
The development of the law in this area didn't stop there. There are
other restrictions that are starting to target the ACLU and advocacy
groups like us. Whatever side of the political spectrum you're on, gov-
ernments are taking direct aim at the speech of advocacy groups organ-
ized as corporations. And the question you have to consider is: does the
ACLU's status as a corporation justify applying a lesser First Amend-
ment standard to the ACLU than would apply to a non-corporate entity?
That's something we obviously are very concerned with.
I hope that goes somewhat in the direction of answering your ques-
tion because that's part of the answer to the question of why the ACLU
30. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Public L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 91 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., & 47 U.S.C.).
31. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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came down on Nike's side of this case, a question I get from everyone.
I'm four years removed from this case. I've moved on to other cases, but
I do recall at the time that there was an NPR show and some other press
on the subject, and the question was always, "Why is the ACLU on this
side of the issue?"
The answer to the question is surprisingly straightforward. You
have to understand what the premises of the First Amendment are, just
like you have to understand what's really behind corporations. The First
Amendment presupposes that freedom of speech, the freedom to speak
one's mind, is not only an aspect of individual liberty and thus constitu-
tionally protected, but it is also essential to the common quest for truth
and the vitality of society as a whole. What this means is that speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression. It is the essence of
self-government. This means that the individual liberty interest serves a
greater purpose. It advances society's interest in a free and unfettered
debate about public issues. The judgment has been made. There is con-
sensus on this issue that in a democratic society, the public interest can
be fulfilled only if debate on matters of public concern is unfettered from
government restrictions.
In a perfect world, there would be no misrepresentation when peo-
ple speak, but erroneous speech is inevitable and must be protected if the
purposes of the First Amendment are to be fulfilled. As the case law
stands, and as it has been settled for at least fifty years, under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. We rely for correction
of those ideas on more speech. Except for cases involving product adver-
tising or where representational interests are at stake-fraud, slander-
courts are not in the business of sorting out the truth. It's left to the court
of public opinion.
Nike's statement in this case was a direct response to criticisms of
its corporate practices. Those practices were the subject of a debate, not a
commercial transaction. The regulation of product advertising is, as I
said, limited to speech that promotes a commercial transaction. The
speech by Nike in this case has a commercial aspect, but it's subordinate
to the political aspect, and that's what distinguishes it from the product
advertising cases. The fact that Nike has an economic interest in what it
says is frankly neither here nor there. Labor unions, for instance, have an
economic interest when they advocate, and that has never been a consid-
eration of the Court. The Court's cases proceed on the assumption that
you can speak without restraint, except in the situations where you are
engaged in product advertising.
The Court's cases and First Amendment jurisprudence proceed
from the assumption that there are a very limited set of circumstances in
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which speech can be prohibited. In the context of corporate speakers or
commercial advertising, those restrictions have been limited to situations
involving product advertising.32 As we heard from our first panel, they
have not been broadly extended to prohibit speech that affects other
matters of public concern. That's what was at stake in Nike.
In Nike, although there was no decision, there were a number of
concurring opinions from the decision not to decide the case.33 The jus-
tices who tend to be on the liberal side of the Court were all of the view,
as I read those concurring opinions, that the speech at stake was the type
of political speech that is fully protected under the First Amendment.34
I understand that sometimes the line gets blurred in the context of
advertising and corporate speech that is in the form of public relations,
but the Court has tools for figuring that out, and it's a subjective test.
They've done it before. They did it in the Bolger case, 35 and they're
perfectly capable of doing it on a case-by-case basis.
I submit that the Nike case wasn't a close call. And if I had to
guess, it would have come down nine-to-nothing against Kasky. That's
all I have to say. There's a lot more to be said about political advertising
restrictions, the commercial speech doctrine, and corporate speech in
general. I think we're going to hear it all today. Thank you.
Ronald Collins: Mr. Lopez, thank you. Our next speaker is
Professor David Vladeck from Georgetown University School of Law.
David Vladeck: Thanks very much for inviting me to participate in
today's panel.
Even though we are discussing a case that was not decided on the
merits, Nike is an important case because it crystallizes two of the essen-
tial critiques about the commercial speech doctrine, critiques that have
run through this doctrine from before its advent in 1976 to today. The
fundamental debate Nike triggered over what constitutes "commercial
speech" and how strictly commercial speech should be regulated is still
being played out - not just in the academy, but also in the courts on a
day-to-day basis. So this is a timely and important topic.
The key issue in Nike, and the core issue in the commercial speech
doctrine, is: what is commercial speech? And next, once you've identi-
32. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562 (1980) ("[O]ur decisions have recognized the commonsense distinction between speech propos-
ing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation,
and other varieties of speech.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
33. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
34. Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J., and joined by Souter, J., as to
Part III).
35. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983) (discussing character-
istics of informational pamphlets to determine if commercial speech).
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fled the domain of commercial speech, what standards should the courts
employ in evaluating government restraints on commercial speech?
Now, obviously, the first question ought to be the definitional
question of, "What is it?" But that turns out to be the more complicated
question, which I'd like to return to in a moment. Let me first talk a bit
about the standards the courts have imposed in evaluating restraints on
commercial speech.
When the Court first decided Virginia Pharmacy Board in 1976,36
the Court clearly was wrestling with what it thought were two impera-
tives. One was the need to open up the channels of communication of
commercial information to listeners, consumers. The Court said-and I
don't think there's any doubt about it-that for the ordinary citizen the
price of pharmaceuticals may be just as important or even more impor-
tant than whatever foreign war is raging at the time. That was true of our
clients in Virginia Pharmacy Board. The plaintiffs in that case, you will
recall, were elderly people who had to drive all over northern Virginia to
find low cost prescription drugs, and they challenged the state law that
prohibited pharmacies from advertising the price of prescription
medications. The Virginia Pharmacy Board Court wanted to get rid of
archaic rules and laws, like the one before the Court, many of which
were highly paternalistic and interfered with the flow of communication
of information that consumers need to better their daily lives. So one im-
perative that drove the Court was the need to clear away anti-competitive
state laws that interfered with the flow of truthful commercial
information that would help consumers make informed purchasing
decisions.
On the other hand, the Court was worried about lifting the flood-
gates to a market that would be rife with falsehoods and half-truths. The
Court wanted to ensure that commercial information flowed "cleanly" as
well as freely. So, if one looks at the story behind Virginia Pharmacy
Board and studies the Court's opinion in that case, the picture that
emerges is an effort to accommodate what the Court saw were two
competing goals: ensuring the flow of truthful information to consumers
relating to purchasing decisions without exposing consumers to an
unreasonable risk of fraud and deception.
By recognizing that commercial speech is deserving of constitu-
tional protection, Virginia Pharmacy Board marks a critical step forward
in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. But the Court's opinion
did not attempt to formulate a standard to guide the Court in evaluating
restraints on commercial speech, and the Court's efforts to do so in the
36. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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intervening thirty years have been less than satisfying. The first efforts to
articulate a test in Central Hudson37 resulted in a controversial, five-to-
four ruling. Justice Blackman, who wrote the Virginia Pharmacy Board
opinion, was unhappy with Justice Powell's formulation in Central Hud-
son38 because, in Justice Blackmun's view, the Central Hudson standard
cut back on the Court's ruling in Virginia Pharmacy Board. And the
Court's efforts to fine-tune the standard since Central Hudson have been
just as controversial.39
In my view, the standard articulated by the Court in Central Hud-
son was intended to be a genuinely "intermediate" standard of scrutiny,
with courts giving legislative judgments considerable deference. The
theory, of course, was that the doctrine was developed to enable to lis-
teners, or consumers, to get information they needed to make informed
choices. 40 And listeners, of course, are interested only in truthful infor-
mation. The theory did not seek to advance the expressive interests of the
speakers; indeed, the early cases are strikingly devoid of any mention of
the speaker's interests. 4 Applying the test as first formulated, the Court
upheld a number of state laws that restrained commercial speech, be-
cause the Court thought that they served sufficiently strong governmental
interests and did so in a way that did not intrude needlessly on protected
speech.42 In recent cases, however, the Court has transformed the stan-
dard without doing so explicitly. No longer do courts give deference to
legislative judgments or uphold restraints that are reasonable and propor-
tionate to the interest they serve. Rather, the standard applied today is a
37. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. According to the majority,
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we
must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For com-
mercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation di-
rectly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id.
38. See id. at 576 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. For a detailed account of the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine, see David C.
Vladeck, Lessons From a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1049, 1055-61 (2004).
40. Id. at 563 ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the infor-
mational function of advertising.").
41. Vladeck, supra note 39, at 1070 n.91 (and authorities cited therein).
42. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding restraint on law-
yer communications to potential clients); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993)
(upholding restraint on advertising lottery information); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)
(remanding case but holding that restraints on commercial speech need not satisfy a "least restrictive
means" test but instead should meet a reasonable "fit" test, which shows that the restraint is "in
proportion to the interest served").
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rigorous one-akin to strict scrutiny-and results in the virtual automatic
invalidation of laws restraining commercial speech.43
One question raised in Nike v. Kasky, and brought up by Mark
Lopez, is whether there is a general notion in First Amendment law that
there is no such thing as a false idea. Nike's defense was, in part, that
even if its statements about its labor practices were wrong, they were
"ideas" entitled to full-bore constitutional protection. Mr. Lopez is right,
of course, that in the realm of political speech, the Court has said often
that there is no such thing as a false idea. But that is demonstrably not
true in the commercial context. The Court has always said that false-
hoods have no place in commercial speech because they distort the mar-
ket; they undermine the values Virginia Pharmacy Board was supposed
to enhance. And, indeed, the First Amendment has never been a defense
to a claim of fraud or deception.
In my view, however, the more troubling and problematic part of
the debate goes to the extent that the government still has leeway under
the commercial speech doctrine to regulate truthful speech. Adam
Winkler earlier pointed out that if the courts undermine the ability of the
government to regulate truthful speech, it would threaten the govern-
ment's ability to impose structural regulations of speech, as Congress
and the Securities and Exchange Commission have done with the regula-
tion of the sale of securities. My point, of course, is that it is not only the
securities laws that are threatened. There are a host of government
programs that depend on the government regulating truthful speech, ei-
ther because of concerns that the speech, although literally true, may be
deceptive or misleading, or because of non-speech concerns. A pharma-
ceutical company may not sell a drug unless the drug's labeling has been
approved by the FDA; a food manufacturer may not sell a can of soup
unless the soup's labeling conforms with federal law. Do these require-
ments violate the First Amendment? Does it matter that, in the case of
pharmaceuticals, the government is worried about possible deception,
while in the case of food items, like soup, the government is using label-
ing to promote a better understanding of nutrition? So one question is
what, if anything, is left of the government's power to regulate truthful
speech?
With respect to potentially misleading speech, the government's
power, in my view, has been greatly circumscribed by the modem com-
mercial speech cases. One case illustrates my concern. The D.C. Circuit,
43. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
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in Pearson v. Shalala,44 invalidated the Food and Drug Administration's
regulations forbidding the sellers of dietary supplements from making
health claims that were not supported by a significant body of scientific
work. Although the court recognized that the statutory scheme governing
dietary supplements was designed to protect against consumers being
misled about the efficacy of the products, the court thought that this goal
could be served equally well through FDA-required disclaimers.45 As a
result of this ruling, the FDA has now revised its regulations governing
health claims on foods and dietary supplements to permit virtually any
claim--even those without substantial scientific support-so long as a
disclaimer appears somewhere on the label.46
Nike therefore exposed, but left unanswered, a wide-range of ques-
tions about the level of scrutiny courts ought to apply in reviewing gov-
ernment restraints on speech--questions to which the Court, at some
point, will have to return. But as I noted at the outset, Nike v. Kasky
raised an even more fundamental question-namely, what is commercial
speech? Nike's principal defense, and I think Mark Lopez has done a
very good job laying it out, was that the kind of statements it made in
defense of its labor practices should be defined as core political speech,
not commercial speech, and thus were entitled to full First Amendment
protection.
After all, Nike contended, our critic threw down the gauntlet, and
we simply picked it up. We did battle with our critics by taking out ads
and engaging in other communications that set forth our position. Nike's
defense of its trade practices, its argument went, did not take place
mainly in newspaper ads or department store fliers, but in letters to the
editor of the New York Times, in letters addressed to university athletic
directors, and in communications to other opinion-makers. Opinion-
makers, Nike pointed out, are not necessarily the same as consumers, and
audience and context should matter in deciding whether speech is
''commercial."
And Nike, of course, had some of the best First Amendment law-
yers in the country making that argument for it: Harvard Law Professor
Larry Tribe, Duke Law Professor and former Acting Solicitor General
Walter Dellinger, and veteran Supreme Court advocate Tom Goldstein.
Of the thirty-three amicus briefs that were filed, the vast majority were
44. 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See generally David C. Vladeck, Devaluing truth:
Unverified Health Claims in the Aftermath of Pearson v. Shalala, 54 FOOD&DRUGL.J. 535 (1999).
45. Id. at 659-60.
46. See Interim Procedures for Health Claims on the Labeling of Conventional Human Food
and Human Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. 41387 (July 11, 2003) (description of FDA's new
regime for permitting unverified health claims to be made for food products).
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filed on behalf of corporate speakers who wanted to expand the reach of
pure speech to cover statements by corporations made in response to
criticisms like those that were leveled against Nike. I
This was, I think, the most interesting part of the debate of Nike.
The first argument Nike made in support of its theory is that the courts
need to level the playing field. After all, isn't it an odd First Amendment
jurisprudence that allows Nike's critics to have broad protection under
the New York Times v. Sullivan standard, while Nike is not permitted to
take advantage of the same protections? Why should participants in the
same debate be judged by different standards? That is plainly the law
today. There is no question that Nike, as a twenty billion dollar company,
qualifies as a "public figure" under the Sullivan test. On the other hand,
Marc Kasky, an obscure activist that no one had heard of before the liti-
gation, is plainly entitled to full-bore constitutional protection because he
plainly was not a public figure. And so the first question was why
shouldn't the playing field be level? Why shouldn't Nike's speech be
treated as pure speech under the First Amendment just as Marc Kasky's
speech would be deemed pure speech, thus giving Nike and Marc Kasky
equal treatment under the law?
Here I want to register my disagreement with Mark Lopez. Mr.
Lopez says that, had the Court reached the question in Nike, nine justices
would have voted to extend protection to this kind of speech, and zero
would have gone in the other direction. I actually think that there are
only two justices who expressed that view, Justice Breyer and Justice
O'Connor.47 I doubt the Court would have taken such a dramatic step, let
alone unanimously, and let me tell you why.
First, Nike's argument, no matter how it's dressed up, was an ar-
gument that it was constitutionally permissible for corporations to lie
about facts salient to consumers in communications that were plainly
designed to reach a consumer audience. Nike's statements about its labor
practices were not made in the rarified air of a debating club. They were
made to staunch consumer defections away from Nike products when
revelation of its exploitive labor practices first hit the press. Nike had to
layoff workers. Nike posted its first loss in its corporate history. Nike's
reputation was tarnished in the eyes of the public. So the argument that
Nike's statements were made principally for political rather than eco-
nomic gain is highly contestable and I think probably could not have
withstood review. But the Court was, in my view, unlikely to conclude as
a matter of law that these statements were "political speech," especially
47. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (Breyer, J., with whom O'Connor, J., joins, dis-
senting).
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since the case had not gotten past the motion to dismiss stage before the
California courts. At best for Nike, the Court would have remanded the
action to permit the parties to flesh out the record on the nature of Nike's
communications and their intended audience, perhaps giving clearer in-
struction as to where the line between political and commercial speech
should be drawn.
Even more fundamentally, I have problems with Nike's claim that,
under current law, the playing field is not level and that corporations
need to be shielded from liability in order to be full participants in what-
ever debate they choose. The simple fact is that corporate speech now
drowns out all other speech. The tobacco industry spends over $15
billion in advertising every year.48 The pharmaceutical companies spend
nearly $16 billion in advertising annually. 49 What non-corporate entity
can match these expenditures?
Contrary to what Mark Lopez suggests, there is rarely a corporate
adversary willing to take on tobacco or drug companies when they pro-
mote a particular product. No company ran ads questioning the safety of
Bextra, Celebrex, or any of the other highly-promoted COX-2 inhibitors.
Nor was there any counter-advertising to the tobacco industry's promo-
tional blitzes until the early 1970s. Even then, as today, the budgets for
public health organizations engaged in anti-tobacco advertising were
dwarfed by the advertising budgets of big tobacco. There is no counter-
advertising for drug products, even those making dubious health claims,
and virtually no counter-advertising for beer and other alcoholic
beverages that are heavily promoted to young people.
So Nike's first claim that the playing field needs to be leveled to
permit it and other corporations to speak freely is a hard one for me to
swallow. The problem, in my view, is not that we lack corporate adver-
tising. Nor do I think it would be right to import the concepts of New
York Times v. Sullivan into commercial speech cases. The public figure
doctrine announced in New York Times v. Sullivan was developed by the
courts to respond to a serious deficit in First Amendment law. An indi-
vidual, a small group of individuals, a small corporation, or, at times,
even the New York Times, could not risk criticizing a large corporation or
a public figure without assuming the risk of sustaining a financial judg-
ment that would either put the company under the water or be ruinous for
the individual or individuals involved. But the First Amendment was not
intended to be the exclusive preserve of the rich or powerful. So the
48. See Federal Trade Commission's 2003 Annual Tobacco Report to Congress, at 2 (2005)
(reporting annual advertising expenses of $15.15 billion for only six manufacturers).
49. M.B. Rosenthal et al., Promotion of Prescription Drugs to Consumers, 346 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 498,498 (2002).
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Court in New York Times v. Sullivan tried to level the playing field by
recognizing that where public figures are the targets of criticism, they
have the wherewithal to defend themselves, and thus a heightened stan-
dard of proof should be required to protect their critics from liability
where the criticism, although wrong, was not made with constitutional
malice.50 To be sure, the Sullivan standard is a leveling device: it permits
resource-poor individuals and organizations to participate in the market-
place of ideas on an equal footing with their resource-rich, public figure
counterparts. But Fortune 500 companies like Nike are hardly resource-
poor organizations easily deterred from speaking out in their own
interest.
Part of it, of course, is the point that Professor Piety made before. In
a libel case, the plaintiff always has equal or superior knowledge of the
facts. For that reason, it is not unfair to place a heightened burden on the
public figure plaintiff to prove falsity and to show that the defendant
knew, or should have known, that the statement was indeed false. That
presumption, of course, would be absolutely backwards in a commercial
speech case. Nike repeatedly argued, correctly, that it, not Marc Kasky,
uniquely had possession of the relevant facts. But that dynamic cut
against Nike's argument. One key point in Sullivan was that misstate-
ments of fact are "inevitable in a free debate" over political and social
matters. 51 But misstatements of fact are hardly inevitable when a corpo-
ration is making statements about matters uniquely within its knowledge
and does so to influence consumer behavior.
Mark Lopez's claim that the ACLU participated in Nike v. Kasky
out of its own self-interest is alarming to me. I worked for Public Citizen,
a public interest group, for nearly thirty years. Public Citizen often criti-
cized corporate wrongdoing, and did so with unrestrained zeal, knowing
full well that it could be sued for trade libel or product disparagement. In
fact, Public Citizen was sued on a number of occasions. That did not
chill our speech, even though at times we faced potential liability that far
outstripped our assets. Consider another example: Consumers Union,
publisher of Consumer Reports, is one of the flagship public interest or-
ganizations. It has been on the wrong side of much product disparage-
ment litigation, including the Bose case before the United States Su-
preme Court,52 and the Suzuki case that went up to the Ninth Circuit
50. See New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (explaining the rationale of New
York Times v. Sullivan).
52. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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twice.5 3 Those cases have not caused Consumers Union to scale back its
advocacy activities for one whit.
I am not suggesting for a moment that we ought to give for-profit
corporations greater protection than they already have in order to insulate
them from liability, nor do I think non-profits deserve additional protec-
tion either. Corporations ought to be held accountable for what they say,
particularly when they are trying to persuade customers to purchase their
wares. Before yielding the podium, I want to discuss briefly the current
issues before the courts on commercial speech. Nike certainly did not
mark the last word in the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine.
And here I want to return to a point I made earlier-namely, that in my
view, the commercial speech doctrine, as an engine of consumer protec-
tion, has suffered serious erosion in the past decade. As a result of this
erosion, there have been impacts both on the regulatory side and on the
litigation side. On the regulatory side, the FDA has already significantly
changed its rules governing health claims on dietary supplements and
food products. If you purchase a food product or dietary supplement to-
day, you will see a health claim on it, maybe or maybe not accompanied
with a disclaimer saying the FDA does not know whether the claim is
true or not. This health claim will be authorized by the FDA, even
though the underlying statute forbids health claims in the absence of
"significant scientific agreement." 54 Why? Because the FDA believes
that the First Amendment no longer permits the agency to enforce the
law the way it is written.55
There have also been a number of "attractive alcohol" advertising
cases brought by parents of children who complain that alcohol ads-
particularly beer ads-are aimed at minors. Many of the problematic ads
appear in periodicals that are disproportionately read by minors. The in-
dustry defense in those cases is, of course, "the First Amendment permits
us to do that." Whether that defense will hold up under scrutiny remains
to be seen, but initially courts have accepted it. These issues are still very
much on the forefront today. Nike, a case undecided, helps crystallize
these issues, but they are by no means resolved. Thank you.
Ronald Collins: Thank you, Professor Vladeck.
We have some questions that the various panelists have proposed.
Feel free, if you want, to ask those questions. It's not my intention to go
53. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2003);
Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 292 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2002).
54. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(b); id. § 343(r)(5)(D) (2006).
55. Interim Procedures for Health Claims on the Labeling of Conventional Human Food and
Human Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. 41387 (July 11,2003) (description of FDA's new regime
for permitting unverified health claims to be made for food products).
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through the litany of them all, but if any of them strikes your fancy, and
you'd like to ask them in their stated form or in a variation that you pre-
fer, I welcome it. Let me start off with one of those questions for our
panel.
Does it seem like Nike was involved in exploitative practices
abroad? Well, certainly, but I'll speak for myself. By my measure, yes.
Does it seem that these work practices they had were unconscionable?
By my measure, yes. Should Nike be held to account? Of course.
The question to the panel: at the end of the day, did Nike really get
away with anything? Did Nike actually mislead anybody? There were
literally thousands of articles, and I would say ninety-eight percent,
maybe even a hundred percent-except for maybe the Nike ad-trade
show-slammed Nike again and again. There were all sorts of TV spe-
cials that slammed the company. I mean, who in the U.S. who reads
newspapers and listens to radios, watches television, could have believed
for a moment, a fleeting moment, that anything that Nike had said bore
any semblance of truth?
Doesn't this prove that at the end of the day this debate was best
left in the court of public opinion and not in the Superior Court of
California?
Tamara Piety: Well, I would say that it seems that Nike appears to
have recovered a lot of market share, and that's what they're interested
in, not so much the public opinion, except insofar as consumers and
investors read it.
The thing I find really interesting about this area is that amongst
many public relations professionals they think that the perception is the
problem. So if you can cure the perception, then you've cured the prob-
lem. In fact, maybe it is better because curing the perception might be
cheaper. The problem is not the labor practices. It's the perception about
the labor practices.
What has been suggested is that Nike didn't release the corporate
social responsibility report because it was involved in this litigation. But
that report has been released now even though the Kasky decision, the
one that was supposed to be so chilling to the company's willingness to
issue this report, is still good law in California.
But an interesting thing happened between the time the case was
argued in the Supreme Court and when they released the report, which
may shed some light on Nike's willingness to release the report. Califor-
nia passed Proposition 64, which repealed the private attorney general
provision of the controlling statutes in the Nike case, so that someone
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like Kasky could no longer sue on behalf of the citizens of California.56
Now the state attorney general can still do so. But apparently Nike's not
worried about the attorney general. I think that says a lot about the de-
gree of corporate influence in government, which will probably be ad-
dressed in the next panel and throughout the day.
But one of the problems here is the problem that Professor Vladeck
bought up, the issue of what can the government do to restrain false
speech?
Mark Lopez: I think you suggested the answer. The First Amend-
ment works in this case just the way it was supposed to. I will quickly
say that I am troubled by the advertising example that Professor Vladeck
put out about how the advertising folks in the tobacco industry drown out
critics and unfairly control the debate. There was an opposing point of
view that eventually won the debate over the safety of tobacco products.
At the end of the day in the tobacco context there was detrimental
reliance. The industry misrepresented the suitability of the product, and
there was a remedy for the people that were injured. That's very different
than Nike where we don't have those factors present.
David Vladeck: Let me say two things. First, I think Nike won the
debate because if one looks at its sales, its counter-advertising campaign
was incredibly effective. As soon as Nike started to respond to the
charges, Nike did pretty well, and the idea that Nike has engaged in self-
censorship as a result of this litigation is very hard to accept.
The other point I would make is that in some ways Nike is interest-
ing because it's such a rich example of a real give-and-take between two
opposing parties that were able to make their voices heard. But that
example is atypical. Often, there is no counter-campaign. Indeed, more
often than not the public is not made aware of these kinds of concerns for
years or decades; consider, for example, the big public health debacles
like tobacco, where the tobacco industry monopolized the debate for
decades.
To be sure, the Surgeon General report came out in 1964, 57 but even
as late as 1984 the vast majority of Americans did not believe there was a
direct link between smoking and health risks because the drumbeat of
doubt sewn by the tobacco industry overwhelmed whatever modest pub-
lic health campaign and counter-advertising campaigns were launched
56. In 2004, Initiative Measure (Prop. 64) § 3 substituted "who has suffered injury in fact and
has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition" for "acting for the interests of
itself, its members or the general public" in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2006).
57. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUBL'N
No. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON
GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964).
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against it. So I think the First Amendment did win in the sense that Nike
was a great case and got people to start thinking about what the role of
corporations in society are and what the First Amendment should say
about it.
Ronald Collins: Before we go, I just have a quick comment. If
Nike was doing so well with its public relations campaign, why did it
settle with Marc Kasky? I think of Marc Kasky as a public figure, so let
me exercise my free speech rights under New York Times v. Sullivan and
its progeny. To me, the real problem was Marc Kasky. I submit to you
that Marc Kasky sold out at the eleventh hour. We wouldn't otherwise be
having this discussion. All the terrible things that Nike allegedly had
done, Marc Kasky could have made public. But he chose to enter into a
secret settlement agreement with Nike. Did he sell out? We don't know.
We can't even find out. But when it's all said and done, the great public
interest advocate who was responsible for all of this simply walked away
into the San Francisco sunset.
We don't know what happened at all in this case, and so at the end
of the day I don't think Nike's public relations campaign worked. If it
did, the company wouldn't have gone out of its way to settle with Marc
Kasky the way it did.
Audience Participant Martin Redish: Professor Vladeck, in your
talk you painted the Nike case in a David-versus-Goliath light, Marc
Kasky against Nike. Marc Kasky's just a schmoe who sued. This was
Bob Herbert of the New York Times, a profit-making corporation. This
was CBS going up against Nike. And in the tobacco litigation, the
American Cancer Society has been very clear what one side of the debate
is, not to mention the government and its required warnings.
Is it fair in a case like Nike? Does it further First Amendment val-
ues for Bob Herbert and the New York Times and CBS when they attack
Nike to have a greater degree of First Amendment protection than when
Nike responds for Nike?
David Vladeck: Well, let me make two points. The first is that Bob
Herbert and the New York Times actually came out on Nike's side in the
litigation, and the only pro-Nike article he ever wrote was defending
Nike's First Amendment rights.58
Martin Redish: Yeah, but that's beside the point.
David Vladeck: No, I think it actually supports your point in some
respects, and in that sense Nike was itself somewhat of an unusual case,
though I would still point out that the notion that the New York Times and
CBS necessarily geared their news stories to counteract the pervasive-
58. Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Let Nike Stay in the Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2002, at A21.
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ness of the Nike ads may not be correct. I don't know. I wouldn't depend
on that.
But if you look at tobacco, which is in my sense a better example
because of the scope and its duration, the American Cancer Society made
almost no dent for the first twenty years in the tobacco wars, almost no
dent at all, nor did the federal government. And if you look at people's
views about smoking and health up until the mid-1980s, it was clear that
one side monopolized the debate. That is what troubles me.
The point I was really trying to make is that I don't understand the
inhibition, or self-censorship argument Nike pressed. I really don't. As
long as you're not lying, you ought to be willing to throw out your ideas,
and, if need be, defend them. What is wrong with that?
The only reason why there was an imbalance in this case is be-
cause, as you put it so eloquently, Kasky was a schmoe. If the battle had
been between CBS and Nike, that would have been an even battle, the
same way the playing field was level in every respect when Philip Morris
sued NBC over the Dateline program, which alleged that Philip Morris
had in fact manipulated the nicotine content in its cigarettes. That's your
case, where there are two well-heeled public figures fighting it out on a
First Amendment issue, and there the playing field is plainly level.
But Nike, of course, never brought a products disparagement action
against anybody the way Suzuki has done, the way lots of other corpora-
tions do when they think they are being unfairly maligned. Nike could
well have sued the New York Times and accused Bob Herbert of
engaging in deliberate falsehoods. And then we could have had your
case, and I would have loved to have seen it. Nike, of course, did no such
thing. One can reasonably ask why.
Audience Participant Erik Jaffe: Two quick questions. Professors
Vladeck and Piety, you criticized the notion that New York Times v. Sul-
livan might apply based on the self-regarding statement as opposed to
other-regarding statements, though I gather it's fairly well-accepted that
New York Times v. Sullivan would even apply to a politician speaking
about himself or herself. So, "I graduated summa from Harvard," it's a
lie. If we wouldn't let people sue that politician for false statements in a
political race, except perhaps under the Sullivan standard of knowing
falsehoods, then, regardless of whether Nike might have survived the
Sullivan standard-and, based on your presentation, perhaps they still
would have been liable under that standard-why wouldn't you apply it
if the issue was not giving the little guy a chance, but just creating
breathing space for fairly debatable factual issues? And perhaps this was
not that case, and it was lost, but we're talking about the standard, not the
results.
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Then, the second question is: why not just apply O'Brien5 9 to com-
mercial speech? Commercial speech is sort of mixed speech that has both
a transactional and an expressive component to it. Why not let the state
regulate the transactional component so long as it doesn't unduly burden
the expressive component and doesn't do so in a viewpoint-
discriminatory manner?
This would seem to solve all transactional problems in the con-
sumer fraud. It would come with a bunch of remedies that would be more
traditionally commercial, like rescission, like damages to people who
actually have standing, unlike Kasky, and that would get rid of this
whole Central Hudson nonsense.
David Vladeck: Let me start with your O'Brien point. Were it only
so easy to hermetically seal off the commercial- and speech-related ac-
tivities of corporations, your O'Brien test might make some sense. There
are two acts here. One is equivalent to burning one's draft card. The
other one is equivalent to taking market activity. You're saying O'Brien
allows the government to regulate the conduct, not the speech, right? As
I understand it, that's your point.
Erik Jaffe: Right, to the extent that the statements were product
representations that went into the decision-making purchase, sure.
David Vladeck: The problem with that idea is that that's not the
way Nike marketed itself. Nike wanted consumers to buy its sneakers not
because they were made better, not because there was any product differ-
entiation, not because they would last longer or anything like that. Nike
wanted you to buy its sneakers because they were good people.
Erik Jaffe: That's okay. It's product characterization.
David Vladeck: Okay. Well, then Nike loses the case, and that's
exactly what Nike-
Erik Jaffe: No, the remedy is rescission assuming any reliance.
Nike doesn't lose this case. It may lose a different case by somebody
who bought the shoe because they felt they were great people, but they
don't lose this case.
Tamara Piety: Well, I think part of the response to that, though, is
that the structure of false advertising law presumes that in the context of
false advertising about a "genuine leather" bag being "made in the U.S.,"
59. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). The Court held that when a course of
conduct combines elements of speech and nonspeech,
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
[Vol. 30:895
Corporations & Commercial Speech
the damages for a consumer if these claims aren't true are not going to be
large enough to really make it meaningful for any individual to sue.
This is the quintessential sort of governmental function to protect
the operation of the market in that context. If you look at it in that
context, no one will ever have the incentive to sue. That's part of the
problem.
David Vladeck: The case was really brought on as fraud on the
market case, just like a securities case, just like any fraud on the market
case. And if you can't bring that kind of case against Nike, how can you
bring in it the securities context?
Audience Participant Kent Greenfield: I wanted to ask you about
this securities law case. If Nike is right, doesn't that make many of the
securities laws problematic under First Amendment grounds-especially
because securities laws don't require an affirmative lie, but only a mate-
rial misrepresentation that is sufficiently misleading as to create a mis-
impression in the mind of the hearer?
Ronald Collins: Well, David Vladeck raised that very point as Pro-
fessor Skover and I were writing our article, and I think it's a strong
point. If Nike-whose rights we thought deserved First Amendment pro-
tection-can make those statements to the public, then by that logic why
couldn't it make them to those who invested in the corporation? I'm hard
pressed to answer that question. Maybe my esteemed colleague Professor
Skover has an answer to the question of why there should be a different
standard, although under current law as it exists, clearly there would be.
Clearly, if Nike had prevailed on First Amendment grounds in the case
as postured, it could make one statement to the public that it might not be
able to make to its shareholders.
Professor Skover, do you care to add anything?
David Skover: Allow me to preface my comments by saying it
may have seemed to the avid readers of our work...
Ronald Collins: All two of them.
David Skover: Yes, indeed. It may have seemed that we have taken
very inconsistent positions in our Nike piece versus what we had said
about the infiltration of commerce into communication in The Death of
Discourse.60 There, we were very critical of the corporatization of speech
in terms of polluting discourse. But in the long run, I think the heart of
the distinction here-the reason why Ron Collins and I took what looked
like a more Nike-protective position in our article-was that we were
concerned about the ramifications of a ruling against Nike for other kinds
of cases.
60. RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (2005).
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I have a question to Tamara Piety and to David Vladeck in this re-
gard. Professor Piety correctly portrayed the movement in advertising
from reason-why to image advertising, which means that fewer and
fewer empirically provable claims are subject to scrutiny. So, in a world
in which image advertising is burgeoning, where empirically provable
claims are fewer and fewer, then why would we likely posit any real con-
sumer harms that the First Amendment should concern itself about?
For example, if we had a case of total puffery-for example: "Nike
has the blessings of the Gods"-would we deny First Amendment pro-
tection? We wouldn't think to deny First Amendment protection. Even
under contract law, we would say this is mere puffery, right? And we
don't really believe in that instance that there's a harm the state should
concern itself with to regulate the marketplace. But in a world of mixed
messages where puffery and possible factual falsities are not easily
demarcated, then what are we to do? That's the really hard question.
What Ron Collins and I were concerned about-and my question to
you is-do we really want to leave to black-robed judges the function of
acting as truth commissioners, determining what misrepresentations there
are in these mixed political-commercial messages?
Tamara Piety: Well, this is so rich with possible topics, but let me
just start by saying that I think one of the things we didn't address today,
but which I addressed in a separate article,6 ' is the degree to which the
law in some ways is continuing to operate on a different paradigm than
that of market and communication, and it's not very well-situated or
positioned to make those distinctions.
For example, FTC regulations with respect to false advertising also
include, like the securities laws, that misrepresentation exists if the
statement is actually true but liable to deceive. And we have a world in
which consumers make decisions on things like the "moral" components
of the product that Nike said were outside of the scope of that. And
we've got this advertising, "Newport, Alive with Pleasure," and the
counter-speech is the tombstone warning, which is not very effective.
Nevertheless, the legal system that we have is constantly, one might
say pretty much exclusively, engaged in separating out facts and situa-
tions. And the question is: should it be on the basis of something real, or
should it be on the basis of an image that we have of what's going on that
is fairly divorced from reality of the practice?
My position in the Nike piece was relatively conservative in the
sense that I was saying let's not throw away the commercial speech
61. Tamara R. Piety, "Merchant of Discontent ": An Exploration of the Psychology ofAdvertis-
ing, Addiction and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377 (2001).
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doctrine-preserve it. But this definitional scope needs to include real
marketing practices, not just traditional advertising, whatever that may
be.
David Vladeck: Let me add two thoughts. The first is that there
have been very few of the kind of cases that we're worried about. Apart
from Nike, the only other image ad case was the Joe Camel case where
there was a cartoon image that was used in a way that people thought
was inappropriate, because they were trying to sell to an audience that
was legally forbidden from purchasing the product.62
The other point I wanted to make is that it is true that that is where
the advertising has gone. That's not where the government regulation is
going. If you look at where the friction is in commercial speech, it is still
generally applicable, not product-specific, government regulation:
whether the FDA can forbid a seller from making a specific claim, such
as "this product will reduce your risk of heart disease," not whether Kel-
logg's is a good company or not. And so it may be true that the advertis-
ing techniques are leaving the commercial speech doctrine in its dust,
and that may be a good thing.
But with respect to specific claims, the kind that Erik Jaffe was
talking about earlier, the commercial speech doctrine is still spawning a
substantial amount of litigation over those issues. The FTC, for example,
may be considering down the road whether to restrain alcohol advertising
in periodicals principally directed at minors. This old-style regulation is
not of the kind that you're necessarily talking about, but it still lies at the
heart of the commercial speech doctrine.
Audience Participant: In the whole issue of someone being hurt, it
would seem that corporations were required to tell the truth so that peo-
ple could not be hurt. But in the context of this kind of behavior by Nike
where corporations are just minimizing costs by going offshore, no one's
being hurt. Everybody's getting cheaper tennis shoes. So in that sense,
what role do damages have to do in the calculus here, if at all?
Apparently, none.
Tamara Piety: Well, as I've indicated before, there seems to be a
presumption that false statements that are likely to affect consumer be-
havior are harmful in and of themselves. I could say, from the perspec-
tive of the Sierra Club, that the reason the Sierra Club was concerned
about it is that there is some sense that something like global warming or
environmental degradation is too big a problem to be solved just by
governmental response. One of the ways to help solve the problem, aside
from governmental response, is via consumer responses-getting
62. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994).
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consumers to vote with their dollars, so that they punish bad practices
and reward good practices.
They can't do that if they don't know a false claim from a good
claim. And if it's just as good to say you did something good, but not
incur the expense of actually doing it, then you can free-ride off of that
interest in good environmental practices and drive the companies who
actually invest in those better practices out of business because you've
not assumed that cost.
Audience Participant Adam Candeub: Whenever we hear the ar-
gument, "why should corporations have First Amendment rights?" we all
know what they're going to say. We know what their position will be.
And we also know that true statements from corporations have enormous
value to the economy. False ones generally decrease utility.
So, if we don't really value corporate contributions to political dis-
course because we all know what it's going to be about, and if we really
do value true statements from corporations because the market can't
work without correct information, then should we be so afraid of judges
chilling corporate speech by requiring corporations to be truthful in all
their publications?
Tamara Piety: Well, I would say no.
David Vladeck: There's one thread that ties all of these cases to-
gether-including the most recent cases-and that is the Court's hostility
to the idea of falsity in the commercial market. In contrast to Mark Lo-
pez, I think that that might have been Nike's undoing in the litigation
because no matter how Nike tried to sell the idea, the company was
asking for license to say untruths in the commercial market, and that was
just a very unpalatable argument.
Mark Lopez: Our position is that Nike is allowed to stake out a po-
sition under the First Amendment on political and social issues that may
have some commercial aspect. But when consumers make decisions
based on those representations, they're making a political decision.
They're not making a point of purchase decision that you would com-
monly associate with product advertising. They're making a political
decision, and it's almost like "consumer beware."
Nike is representing that this is the better way to do business. This
is how we do business, and they're not being entirely candid, we can all
probably agree, about how they are doing business, but they're probably
not being as bad as the allegations were. They had to be accepted for
purposes of the complaint as an outright lie, but that's not how it would
have played out in court. It would have been a gray line. It would have
been a very gray area about what Nike's practices actually were-what
was actually going on.
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So, when Nike speaks, especially in the context of a debate where
there's a lot of other speakers, consumers are not making a purchasing
decision in the sense that you and I make purchasing decisions about
suitability or price. They're making a political decision.
Now, I agree with the fellow about the securities industry. To me
that's a trickier question. I really don't have an answer for it, because if
I'm a shareholder or thinking about buying securities in a particular
company, I'd want to make sure that every representation is a correct
representation, so I guess there will be a separate body of law that's
going to deal with that.
Kent Greenfield: But what if as a shareholder you care about
whether they're doing business in an unjust way in Vietnam?
Tamara Piety: Well, let me just suggest the problem no one raised,
as a counterargument to my own position, and that is the difficult prob-
lem of someone like Martha Stewart of Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia when she said, "I'm not guilty of securities fraud."
Now, she's an individual defendant. Can she defend herself? She
obviously ought to be able to defend herself, but in making this statement
is she motivated to defend herself or to help the company or both? Was
that directed at improving the stock position?
Audience Participant: First of all, just a quick comment. I think
the idea that we don't consider as consumers the practices as a generality
and that we just go pick the cheapest thing off the shelf is very insulting
to some of us who are discerning.
But the other question I have is regarding this idea of puffery. Let
them go at it. I'm concerned about vulnerable groups, particularly the
advertising to "tweens" and younger children and young adults, who in
other areas of the law we recognize as not having the maturity and ability
to factor through reason and so forth. Are we going to regulate that area
and protect-I guess I'm the voice of "what about the children" now-a
child so that they can make up their own mind? They can't in this day
and age.
David Vladeck: Under the ACLU's position, the alcohol industry
would have a right to advertise, maybe even in the Weekly Reader. And
one of the great debates with respect to alcohol and tobacco is what do
you do with advertisements that are plainly geared for kids? The alcohol
industry has a "voluntary standard" in which they agree not to advertise
in certain periodicals that are aimed particularly at kids, like the Weekly
Reader, but it's a voluntary standard that is not faithfully followed.
There have been many violations of the Master Settlement Agree-
ment that voluntarily restricts the tobacco industry's ability to advertise
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to kids. The Supreme Court, unfortunately, in Lorillard,6 3 struck down
by five-to-four Massachusetts's effort to largely ban outdoor advertising
of tobacco, which I think really reflects a shift by the Court on commer-
cial speech. I think that twenty years ago Massachusetts would have won
that case.
Ronald Collins: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your
attention.
63. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
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